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1958] RECENT CASES 165
adoption statutes of this state do not purport to affect the relationship otlany
person other than that of the parent's by blood, the adopting parents, and the
child." Other courts with similar statutes have held accordingly.9 This would
seem to indicate that the adoption statutes in the instant case are not appli-
cable in determining the testatrix's intention.
In interpreting a will to find the intention of the testator the following
presumptions are found to be in general use by the courts. The presumption
that where the testator is the adoptive parent, an adopted child is included
in the term "children". 10 Where the testator is not the adoptive parent, the
presumption is that he did not intend such inclusion,"5 especially when the
adoption takes place after the testator's death.12 Only where the testator has
clearly shown by other words that he intended to use the word "children" in
a more extensive sense will this presumption be overcome.':.
The holding in the instant case would appear to give one taking a life
estate with remainder to his children what is in effect a general power of
appointment over the property. There seems to be nothing to prevent thc
holder of the life estate from adopting anyone whom he wishes to take the
property upon his death.1" Such a result does not seem to be in accord with
legislative intent as expressed in the adoption statutes, nor with the intent
of a testator in circumstances similar to those in the instant case.
RICHARD A. RAHLFS.
CIVI. PROCEDURE - DiscovmtY - LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE LIMITS
NOT DISCOVERABLE. - In an action arising out of a motorcycle-automobile
collision, plaintiff sought, by discovery proceedings, knowledge of the limits
of defendant's automobile liability policy. In reversing the lower court's order
requiring defendant to answer questions on this point, the Supreme Court of
Florida, one justice dissenting, held that limits of liability in insurance policies
are not matters subject to discovery under the Florida Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1957).
tate of Pence, 117 Cal. App. 323, 332-333, 4 P.2d 202; In re Estate of Jones, 3 Cal.
App.2d 395, 39 P.2d 847; In re Estate of Stewart, 30 Cal. App.2d 594, 86 P.2d 1071;
In re Estate of Pierce, 32 CaL2d 265, 269, 196 P.2d 1; Probate Code, sec. 257." In In re
Stewart's Estate, supra at 1073 the California District Court of Appeal allowed an estate
to escheat to the state, rather than allow the adopted children of a predeceased cousin
of the intestate take. The court said that "had the legislature intended to enlarge the
right of succession of an adopted child to inherit through, and not trom the adopted
parent, it would have so provided."
9. See Batcheller-Durkee v. Batcheller, 39 R.I. 45, 97 At. 378 (1916) and case's
cited therein.
10. Brunton v. International Trust Co., 114 Colo. 298, 164 P.2d 472, 477 (1945)
(dictum); Appeal of Wildman, 111 Conn. 683, 151 AtI. 265, 266 (1930) (dictum);
Wilder v. Wilder, 116 Me. 389, 102 AtI. 110, 111 (1917) (dictum).
11. Brunton v. International Trust Co., supra note 10; Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaff-
ney, 46 Conn. 61, 112 Atl. 689 (1921); Pierce v. Farmers State Bank, 222 Ind. 116,
51 N.E.2d 480 (1943); Copeland v. State Bank and Trust Co., 300 Ky. 432, 188 S.W.2d
1017 (1945); Wilder v. Wilder, supra note 10; In re Fisler, 131 N.J.Eq. 310, 25 A.2d
265 (Prerog. Ct. 1942).
12. Appeal of Wildman, 111 Conn. 683, 151 Atl. 265 (1930); Copeland v. State
Bank and Trust Co., supra note 11.
. 13. Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. .79, 23 S.E.2d 420 (1942); Copeland v. State Bank
and Trust Co., upra note 11; In re Fisler's Estate, 131 N.J.Eq. 310, 25 A.2d 265
(Prerog Ct. 1942).
14. See Bedinger v. Graybill's Executor and Trustee, 302 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1957)(where testatrix placed a fund in trust for her son for life, remainder to his heirs at law,
and upon failure of heirs, to specified charities. Eighteen years after testatrix died the son
adopted his wife. The court allowed the adopted wife to take under the will as a "child"
of the son.)
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The applicable statutes in the instant case, as in most states which have an
adaptation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provide for discovery of
all relevant matters in pending litigation not privileged,' and that are ad-
missible or lead to admissible evidence. 2
An analysis of existing precedent reveals divergent views with regard to
the question of relevancy of liability policy limits.3
Those courts whch hold that matters of insurance are discoverable apply
a broader meaning to the term "relevancy" in discovery proceedings than at
trial.4 They contend that Rule 15 contemplates settlement out of court as
well as by litigation in defining the scope of the Rules.
An equally impressive line of authority holds that this matter is not of it-
self sufficiently material for discovery purposes in pending litigation. 6 The
underlying rationale is that Rule 1 does not take into its scope the matter of
settlement out of court, but pertains only to such action over which the court
has control.7 This line of cases also holds that to be relevant the matter
must be admissible or lead to admissible evidence." The advocates of this
view indicate, however, that there may be instances where insurance may be
relevant in discovery proceedings, 9 but to be discoverable good cause must
be shown.10
1. Fla. Stat. Ann. R.Civ.P. 1.21 (b).
2. Fla. Stat. Ann. R.Civ.P. 1.28.
3 Brackett v. Woodall Products Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951); Orgel v. Mc-
Curdy, 8 F.R.D. 585 (S.D. N. Y. 1948); Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.
2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951); People v. Fischer, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588
(1957); Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1954). Contra McNelley v. Perry,
18 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955); McClure v. Boeger, 105 F.Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa.
1952); Brooks v. Owens, 97 So.2d 693 (Fla. 1957); Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn.
547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955).
4. See Brackett v. Woodall Products Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951) (This
case relied primarily on the Financial Responsibility Statutes as crucial in determining
the relevance of insurance in discovery. The reasoning here was that since these statutes
require minimum limits in the form of bonds or insurance policies, which must be revealed
to state authorities in case of an accident, they should be discoverable in proceedings
while action is pending in a case, as they are matters of public record under this sta-
tute.); Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951) (The
rationale to justify discovery is that since automobile liability policies are for the benefit
of the injured third party in case of the insured's negligence, the matter of insurance is
not for the sole knowledge of the insured and insurer, thus giving the injured third party
a discoverable interest.); Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1951) (In that
case the court felt that since standard liability policies provide that persons injured by
negligence of the insured may institute proceedings against an insurer if a judgment
against the insured is returned msatisfied, in which instance the matter of insurance is
relevant, it should also be relevant prior to the judgment.).
5. See N.D.R.Civ.P. 1 Referring to the new rules of procedure. "They shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
6. McNelley v. Perry, 18 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955); McClure v. Boeger, 105
F.Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 19t2); Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1957); Jeppesen v.
Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955).
7. See Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1957); Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243
Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955).
8. McClure v. Boeger, 105 F.Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1952); Brooks v. Owens, 97 So.
2d 693 (Fla. 1957) (The fundamental purpose of our court system is to insure through
their employment an opportunity to prove liability and resulting damages. Liability limits
of insurance policies are not material for either of these purposes.)
9. See McNelley v. Perry, 18 F.R.D. 360, 361 (E.D. Tenn. 1955) (dictum) "If
defendant is insolvent so pro-ration of insurance beoomes an issue among the various
claimants, the question of insurance would become material.".
10. Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1957) (It should be noted that the rule
regarding discovery by deposition does not require a showing of good cause; however, the
rule providing for inspection of documents has such a requirement. The argument of the
Brooks case is that the two rules must be read together for purposes of.-onstruction. Fail-
ure to so construe would allow discovery without showing cause in 'the case of an oral
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It should be noted that North Dakota has not passed on this question.
Since North Dakota has rules similar" to those in the main case, the prob-
len comes into sharp focus since it will undoubtedly arise eventually in our
own courts. It is submitted that the rule of the instant case expresses the
more logical view of construction, and that which North Dakota should
follow.
RALPH E. KOENIG.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw- PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY- CURFEW ORDI-
NANCE WHICH PaomBrrs MINoRs UNDER SEVENTEEN FROM BEING ON THE
-" srs DURINc CERTAIN RESTRICTED HOURS Is VoiD. - Appellant, aged 21,
was about to be prosecuted- under an ordinance which prohibited any person
from assisting-or encouraging minors under seventeen to violate a curfew or-
dinance.' Prohibition proceedings were initiated to prevent prosecution under
the allegedly unconstitutional curfew ordinance. 2 The court held that the
curfew ordinance was unconstitutional as an unlawful invasion of personal
rights and liberties. Alves v. Justice Court of Chico Judicial District, 306
P.2d 601 (Cal. App. 1957).
Courts have repeatedly upheld legislation applicable to the protection and
welfare of minors, but there exists only a few legal precedents construing
curfew ordinances3 In 1.898 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 4 held un-
constitutional an ordinance enacted without express legislative authority. a
The court indicated that exceptions might arise which would necessitate the
minor's violation of the ordinance, and as stated in their opinion, "... so
numerous do they occur to us that they serve themselves to bring into
question the reasonability of the law."s
deposition, and requiring a showing of good cause in the instance of discovery of written
matters. This would be anomolous according to the view of the Brooks case. It should be
observed that the North Dakota Rules have no specific renuirement that good cause he
shown as a prerequisite-to discovery in either case. See N.D.R.Civ.P. 34(4).
11. N.D.R.Civ.P. 26(b); N.D.R.Civ.P. 34(a).
1. The court did not allude to the fact that the minor was married and emanci-
pated from his parents' control.
2. Chico Municipal Code, 1 684 "Subdivision (a). It shall be unlawful for any
minor under the age of seventeen years of age to be in or on any public street, park,
square or any public, place between the hours of 10:00 o'clock P.M. and 5:00 o'clock
A. M. of the following day, except when and where said minor is accompanied by a
parent or legal guardian having the care and custody of said minor, or where the presence
of said minor in said place or places is connected with and required by, some legitimate
business, trade, profession or occupation in which said minor is engaged.
"Subdivision (b). Any person assisting, aiding, abetting or encouraging any minor
under the age of seventeen years to violate the provisions of Subdivision (a) hereof shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor . . ." (The court construed "business", in Subdivision (a),
as employment and not just any legitimate activity.).
3. See, e.g., People-v. Walton, 70 Cal. App. 2d 862, 161 P.2d 498 (1945).
4. Ex parte McCarver, 39 Tex. Crim. 448, 46 S.W. 936 (1898). The ordinance
prohibited all persons under 21 from being on the streets after 9 P.M. unless accompanied
by parents or guardian or unless such minor was in search of a physician.
5. North Dakota has no express provision which grantst the power to enact a cur-
few'ordinance. But see, N.D. Rev. Code § 40-0501 (1943).
6. Ex porte McCarver, 39 Tex. Crim. 448, 46 S.W. 936 (1898). The McCarver
case cited several cases involving liberty of association and movement but it is sub-
mitted that since we now have several decisions construing curfew ordinances such an
analogy is no longer a sound one as minors constitute a class which is distinct from
adults. For curfew cases not necessarily pertaining to minors see, Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320. U.S. 81 (1943) (Curfew for Japanese-Americans during World War
II held valid.); Clty of Shreveport v. Brewer, 225 La. 93, 72 So. 2d 308 (1954)
(Ordinance which defined acting in a dangerous and suspicious manner included anyono
who is found on the streets after midnight without a satisfactory explanation held in-
